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ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
IN A UNION SETTING:
HISTORY, CONTROVERSY AND
A SIMPLER SOLUTION
Janet McEneaney*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided that an
employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement had the
right to bring an individual Title VII claim, even though the contract between the employer and the union provided for arbitration
of employment disputes.' That case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,2 has remained the law in spite of the Court's 1991 decision in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.3 Recently, some courts
have questioned the continued viability of Alexander.' It is worthwhile to examine the history of arbitration of statutory claims under
collective bargaining agreements, the controversies it has engendered, and what might be done to ensure fairness in resolving these
disputes.
*

The author is an attorney, a Trial Examiner at the New York City Office of

Collective Bargaining, an arbitrator and mediator, and teaches at New York University and
Cornell-New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. She is currently President

of the New York Chapter of the Industrial Relations Research Association.

She

acknowledges, with gratitude, the support and encouragement of Patrick, Laura and Liam

McEneaney; the guidance and generosity of George Nicolau and Milton Rubin; the research
work of Evan J. Shenkman, Cornell-New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Class of 1998; and the assistance of Diane Y. Cornelius, Esq. and Rory G. Schnurr,

St. John's University School of Law, Class of 1998.
1. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 40-43, 52 (1974).
2. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699-700 (11th Cir. 1992);

Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 956 F.2d-932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
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II.

HISTORY

Wilko, Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy
The Federal Arbitration Act of 19251 first expressed Congress's
endorsement of arbitration as a forum although, arguably, only for
commercial disputes.6 In Wilko v. Swan,7 the Supreme Court
declined to extend that endorsement to a claim under section 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 19338 because it doubted the adequacy of
arbitration as a forum for the resolution of statutory claims. 9 The
courts continued to find that a judicial forum was superior for
enforcing statutory rights, that compulsory arbitration contravened
public policy by forcing an individual to waive the right to a judicial
forum, and that the informality of arbitration was not conducive to
subsequent judicial review of the award. 10
In the context of labor relations, however, the Supreme Court
developed a strong policy favoring arbitration of collective bargaining disputes." In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,'2 it
decided that, under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,13 parties to
a collective bargaining agreement could be required to submit labor
disputes to binding arbitration, despite the exclusion of employment contracts under the Federal Arbitration Act. 14 The Court
stressed that grievance arbitration is a substitute, not for litigation,
but for a strike. Agreeing to arbitrate labor disputes in return for
agreeing not to strike was the bargain that was to be enforced by
the federal courts.'5
5. 43 Stat. 883 (1925), codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1-307 (1994).
6. See idi; See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)
(The FAA was passed in 1925 to "place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts," and expressly mandated enforcement of arbitration agreements.) Section
2 of the statute provides that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
7. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
8. See hil at 436; 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
9. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
10. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d
Cir. 1968); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
11. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957).
12. Id. at 448.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
14. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451.
15. See id. at 453-54; PAUL PRASOW & EDWARD PETERS, ARBITRATION AND
COLLECrIvE BARoAinINrG

51 (2d ed. 1983).
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In 1960, in the three cases which came to be known as the Steel-

workers Trilogy,'6 the Court announced that grievance arbitration
would be the endorsed method for resolving industrial disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements.' 7 To that end, a
court would no longer review the merits of a grievance because it
was the arbitrator's judgment, not the court's, for which the parties
had bargained when they agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration.' 8 Conversely, an arbitrator's award was to be confined to
interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement and would be enforceable only as long as it "drew its essence"
from the contract.' 9
From Alexander to Gilmer
The Court's endorsement of grievance arbitration as a substitute
for industrial strikes was not an endorsement of arbitration as a
substitute for litigation of statutory employment claims, as it made
clear in the Alexander case.2" Alexander was a member of a collective bargaining unit who claimed that he had been discharged
because of racial discrimination. 2 The employer alleged that the
termination was justified by Alexander's work performance.22 The
In essence, Section 301(a) provides that suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
interstate commerce or between any such labor organizations may be brought in
any United States District Court having jurisdiction of the parties, without regard to
the amount in controversy or the parties' citizenship.
Section 301(b) states that any labor organization or employer in an industry
affecting interstate commerce shall be bound by the acts of its agents, and any such
labor organization may sue or be sued in the United States courts as an entity and
on behalf of the employees whom it represents, and any money judgment against
the labor organization in a United States District Court shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and not against any
individual member or his assets.
Id.
16. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
17. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568; Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at
582; EnterpriseWheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.
18. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568; Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at
582; Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.
19. See Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582.
20. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
21. See id. at 39.
22. See id. at 38.
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union filed a grievance under the procedure provided in the contract, and Alexander fied a Title VII claim.23 When the union lost
the grievance at arbitration, the employer moved for summary
judgment on the Title VII action.24
The district court found that Alexander was precluded from
bringing his statutory claim because of the arbitrator's decision, and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision.' The Supreme Court
reversed, and held that bringing the grievance to arbitration did not
preclude Alexander from subsequently pursuing his statutory claim,
even though he had not been successful in the arbitration. 6
The issue in Alexander was whether a union's agreement to arbitrate employment claims could subsume the plaintiff's right to file a
Title VII claim.2 The Court found that it could not, citing the possibility of conflict between the interests of the union and its individual members.28 It held:
[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights
under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive
certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the
right to strike. These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be
exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining
agent to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII,
on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns
not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal
employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute
and represent a congressional command that each employee be
free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional
purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's9
rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 39, 42.
See id. at 43.
See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 43.
See id. at 59-60.
See id. at 45-46.
See id. at 55.
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
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Since 1974, the Court has extended this doctrine to claims under
other Federal employment statutes.3 0

The Alexander Court also expressed its "mistrust" of arbitration
as an adequate forum for statutory claims. 31 The Court gave sev-

eral reasons for finding labor arbitration to be inappropriate in
these cases. It believed that labor arbitrators did not have the right

kind of experience to hear statutory claims or the authority to do
so. 32 In addition, it questioned the adequacy of fact-finding proce33

dures in arbitration and the informality of arbitration hearings.
Although the Supreme Court held that an employee's statutory
right to trial under Title VII is not foreclosed by submitting a claim
to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, 34 in the
1980's, it began to uphold arbitration of statutory claims in a commercial context, under the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA]. 35 As
the Court expanded arbitration to commercial transactions, it created a presumption, based on the language of the FAA, that Congress did not intend to prohibit arbitration of statutory claims
unless it was clearly prohibited by the statute in question.3 6 It also
assumed, in commercial cases, that arbitrators were competent to
30. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994);
McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (reasoning that when a claim was
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "an arbitration proceeding cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial trial" in protecting individual rights); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728,737 (1981) (recognizing the federal policy behind encouraging
arbitration where a claim was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219, but concluding that an employee's specific, substantive rights would be intolerably
compromised by mandatory arbitration of claims "arising out of a statute designed to provide
minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers"); Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618
F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
31. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
32. See id. at 57 & n.18.
33. See id. at 57-58.
34. See id.at 49.
35. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims arising under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims under
civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1994) and section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1994)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)
(enforcing an agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1994)).
36. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
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hear them and that the procedures were adequate to ensure fairness
and comity with a judicial forum.37
In 1991, the Court decided a case in which the lower court had
refused to compel arbitration of a statutory employment claim.3 8
Gilmer was a stockbroker who was required, as a condition of
employment, to register with the New York Stock Exchange. 9 The
registration agreement contained a provision in which he agreed to
take to arbitration any dispute arising from his employment or its
termination.4" He was not a member of a bargaining unit, there was
no collective bargaining agreement and
he signed the registration
41
agreement in his individual capacity.
When his employment was terminated, Gilmer fied a claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and
Interstate moved to compel arbitration.42 The district court, citing
Alexander, upheld Gilmer's right to take his statutory claim to
court.43 The Fourth Circuit looked to the recent commercial cases,
such as Mitsubishi, and finding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements,"
reversed the lower court's decision."
Gilmer relied on Alexander when he argued that mandatory arbitration of his claim would compel him to waive his right to bring a
statutory claim to court.45 Attempting to rebut the presumption
created by the courts in the commercial cases, he argued that
mandatory arbitration was inconsistent with the purposes of the
ADEA and that it usurped the enforcement powers of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.46 He also claimed that it
37. See, e.g., Shearson, 482 U.S. at 232 ("[T]he streamlined procedures of arbitration do
not entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights."); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628
("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.");
38. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1990).
39. See id.
40. See id at 23.
41. See id. at 33.
42. See id- at 23-24.
43. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.

44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 27.
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deprived him of the judicial forum guaranteed by statute.47 The

Supreme Court found arbitration of the claim to be mandatory
under the FAA.48

Addressing Gilmer's reliance on Alexander, the Court distinguished the cases in three ways.4 9 It noted that Alexander had been

subject to a collective bargaining agreement, creating a "tension
between collective representation and individual statutory rights,"
while "Gilmer's access to arbitration, if a dispute arose, was not
controlled by a union, or any other entity or individual."5 Secondly, Alexander dealt with the conflict between the preclusive
effect of an arbitration award and the right subsequently to litigate
a statutory claim, while the issue in Gilmer was whether an individual agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim could be enforced. 5 '
The third distinction was that, unlike Gilmer, Alexander was not
decided under the Federal Arbitration Act.52 Citing the FAA, the
Court found a Congressional presumption in favor of arbitration,
which could be rebutted only by showing that Congress "evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue."5' 3 In distinguishing Gilmer from Alexander, the
Court clearly stated that statutory rights in a federal forum could
not be waived where a collective bargaining agreement compelled
arbitration.54
Also, although Gilmer himself did not argue that the agreement
to arbitrate was excluded from enforcement by section 1 of the
47. Several amici curiae offered the theory that, because the FAA does not cover
"contracts of employment," it could not be applied to Gilmer's case.
48. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 35.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id.; see also Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997).
As the [Gilmer] Court observed, the labor arbitrator's authority and power in
Alexander were limited to interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; the
labor arbitrator was not authorized to resolve any statutory claims. For that reason,
the agreement to arbitrate the contract claims under the collective bargaining
agreement in Alexander could not preclude litigation of a statutory claim, which was
outside its scope .... In Gilmer, by contrast, the agreement covered the arbitration
of statutory as well as contractual claims .... That made it, the Court noted, a "quite
different issue."
Brisentine, 177 F.3d at 523-24 (citations omitted).
52. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
53. Id. at 26. "It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act." Id.
54. See id.
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FAA, several amici curiae did.55 The Supreme Court chose not to
decide that issue, holding that the registration agreement was not a
contract of employment. 6
III.

CONTROVERSY

Increasingly, parties to collective bargaining agreements are
including in their contracts provisions mandating arbitration of individual statutory claims.57 Some courts continue to recognize Alexander as controlling in cases where there is a collective bargaining
agreement, and some do not.5 8 The Third, Fourth and Sixth Circuits have compelled arbitration of statutory claims under collective
bargaining agreements, while the Second, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have refused to do so.5 9
Many questions have been raised concerning the voluntary
nature of such collectively bargained arbitration provisions, the tensions between majority and minority rights within unions, the
nature of statutory rights and whether Alexander is still good law.60
The following is an overview of the cases and issues in controversy.
The Courts DisagreeAbout Alexander and Gilmer
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway,6 decided by the Fourth Circuit,
the plaintiff was a member of a bargaining unit whose union negotiated a contract provision calling for mandatory arbitration.6" The
collective bargaining agreement contained an anti-discrimination
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Martin v. Dana, 1997 WL 313054 (3rd Cir. June 12, 1997), vacated and rel'g
granted, 114 F.3d 421 (1997).

58. See, e.g., Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997)
(stating that Alexander should be applied to collective bargaining agreements instead of
Gilmer); Martin, 1997 VL 313054, at *8 (stating that in specific situations where an individual
employee can compel arbitration, Gilmer,not Alexander, should control).
59. See, e.g., Brisentine,117 F.3d 519; Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th
Cir. 1997); Martin, 1997 WL 313054; Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.
1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996); Varner v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.
1996); Wedding v. Univ. of Toledo, 89 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 1996); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d

Cir. 1995);
60. See Harrison,112 F.3d at 1453 (adopting "the majority view.., that Alexander and
its progeny remain good law and that statutory employment claims are independent of a

collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures").
61. 78 F.3d 875.

62. See id. at 878.
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clause subject to the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure.63 Because of this contract provision between the union and
the employer, the court concluded that Austin had voluntarily
agreed to submit her discrimination claims to the grievance
procedure.64
65
A more recent case in the Third Circuit, Martin v. Dana Corp.,
also upheld a mandatory arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement.66 The plaintiff, a member of a bargaining unit,
brought a Title VII claim against his employer. 67 Dana moved to
dismiss, on the grounds that its contract with the union provided
that "[a]ny and all claims regarding equal employment opportunity
provided for under this Agreement or under any federal, state or
local fair employment practice law shall be exclusively addressed by
an individual employee or the Union under the grievance and arbitration provisions of this Agreement."68 Relying on Gilmer and
Austin, and holding that Alexander no longer controlled, the lower
court found for the company and the Third Circuit affirmed the
decision.69

In another case concerning an anti-discrimination provision, the
Sixth Circuit found a statutory claim arbitrable under the collective
bargaining agreement.70 In Wedding, a university employee filed
federal statutory claims and a grievance where the contract called
for the university to defer arbitration of the grievance until the federal claims were resolved.71 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit declined
63. See id.at 879-80.
64. See id. at 885.
65. 1997 WL 313054 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997) vacated and reh'g granted,114 F.3d 428 (3d

Cir. 1997).
66. See id. at *1.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. The Third Circuit vacated its decision on July 1, 1997, and granted a rehearing, en

banc. See Martin v. Dana, 114 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1997). On September 12, 1997, it remanded
the case to the original panel. On Dec. 16, 1997, it reversed the lower court's decision

without issuing a published opinion.
70. See Wedding v. University of Toledo, 89 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 1996).
71. The contract provision stated:
The procedures described in this Article shall constitute the sole and exclusive

method used for resolution of grievances. If a grievant seeks relief through a
judicial or administrative forum outside of this grievance procedure for a subject
matter covered by a grievance, the processing of the grievance shall be held in

abeyance until the outside forum has issued a final determination or unless both the
Employer and [the union] agree otherwise.
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to decide whether arbitration of the statutory claims was
mandatory, believing that to do so would be substituting its judgment for the arbitrator's.7 2

The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, decided that a grievance
and arbitration procedure in the collective bargaining agreement
did not make mandatory the arbitration of a federal discrimination
claim, where only the union could take statutory claims to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. 73 The court recognized a tension between the need to allow unions and employers to
establish a framework for resolving employment disputes and the
interest and benefit in enforcing the statutory rights of minority
groups. 74

Further evidence of a split amongst the circuits are the decisions
in Varner v. NationalSupermarkets,Inc. 75 Harrisonv. Eddy Potash,
Inc.,7 6 Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Corp.77 and Tran v. Tran.78 In
Id. at 317.
72. See id
73. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
295 (1997).
74. See id. at 360. "The essential conflict is between majority and minority rights ....
An agreement negotiated by the union elected by a majority of the workers in the bargaining
unit binds all the members of the unit." Id. at 362. "The union cannot consent for the
employee by signing a collective bargaining agreement that consigns the enforcement of
statutory rights to the union-controlled grievance and arbitration machinery created by the
agreement." Id. at 363.
75. 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Alexander, the court refused to compel
arbitration because the jurisdictional prerequisites dictated in Title VII did not include
exhausting grievance procedures under a collective bargaining agreement).
76. 112 F.3d 1437,1453-54 (10th Cir. 1997). Citing Alexander, the court followed what it
called "the majority view" and found in favor of the plaintiff. See id. It held that the context
in which the agreement arises is most important and stated, "[a]lthough plaintiffs like the one
in Gilmer at least have the 'theoretical possibility of negotiating a separate deal with their
employers' that does not require arbitration, unionized employees have no such choice."' Id.
at 1454 (quoting Martin Malin, ArbitratingStatutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer,40 ST. Lotus U. Li. 77,87 (1996)). See also Randolph v. Cooper Indus., 879 F. Supp.
518, 521 (W.D. Pa. 1994) ("Nothing in Gilmer suggests that the Court abandoned its concern
about the inherent conflicts between group goals and individual rights that exist in the giveand-take of the collective bargaining process.").
77. 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997). The court distinguished Alexander and Gilmer and
concluded that,
a mandatory arbitration clause does not bar litigation of a federal statutory claim,
unless three requirements are met. First, the employee must have agreed
individually to the contract containing the arbitration clause-the union having
agreed for the employee during collective bargaining does not count. Second, the
agreement must authorize the arbitrator to resolve federal statutory claims-it is
not enough that the arbitrator can resolve contract claims, even if factual issues
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each of these cases, as in Pryner,the plaintiffs were union members
subject to collective bargaining agreements which contained grievance and arbitration procedures. 79 Each employer sought to dismiss the statutory claim on the grounds that the collective

bargaining agreement made arbitration mandatory.8" In each of
these cases, the court found for the plaintiff.8 1

The Circuits DisagreeAbout Whether Collective Bargaining
Agreements are Enforceable Under the FAA
Section 1 of the FAA excludes "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce" from the jurisdiction of the Act,
including enforcement of arbitration agreements.' A question
which has not been settled amongst the circuits is precisely which
kind of employment contracts are meant to be excluded and
whether collective bargaining agreements are among them.83 The

Supreme Court sidestepped the issue in Gilmer and has not decided
it yet.8' The majority interpretation of the Act is that employment
agreements are included within the scope of the FAA, but collecarising from those claims overlap with the statutory claim issues. Third, the
agreement must give the employee the right to insist on arbitration if the federal
statutory claim is not resolved to his satisfaction in any grievance process. All three
of those requirements were met in the Gilmer case, which is the latest word from
the Supreme Court on the subject. None of the requirements were met in this case.
IL at 526-27.
78. 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Gilmer from Alexander and holding that
compulsory arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement differs from
arbitration under an individual contract); see also Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc.
959 F. Supp. 805 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (discussing that employee's unsuccessful effort to submit
discrimination claim to arbitration did not preclude her from bringing statutory claims in
federal court). In Tran, the statutory claim arose under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
court found, as the Supreme Court had in Barrentine,that the federal court should "reach the
merits of the wage and hour claims." Tran, 54 F.3d at 118.
79. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 519; Harrison,112 F.3d at 1437; Varner, 94 F.3d at 1209;
Tran, 54 F.3d at 115.
80. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 519; Harrison,112 F.3d at 1437; Varner, 94 F.3d at 1209;
Tran, 54 F.3d at 115.
81. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 519; Harrison,112 F.3d at 1437; Varner, 94 F.3d at 1209;
Tran, 54 F.3d at 115.
82. See Robert J. Lewton, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements a Viable
Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment Discrimination
Claims? 59 ALB. L. REv. 991, 997 n.3 (1996).
83. See id. (providing a fine discussion of this subject).
84. But see, Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in which
Chief Judge Edwards noted,
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tive bargaining agreements are not.85 The majority of circuits have
held that the exclusion clause should be narrowly construed to
apply only to workers who are involved directly in interstate transportation of goods.86 Therefore, most circuits have found that individual contracts of employment not involving workers directly
engaged in the interstate transportation of goods are enforceable
under the FAA.

7

A related question is whether collective bargaining agreements
are subject to enforcement under the FAA. The Second Circuit, in
a 1997 case, held that the FAA does not exclude collective bargaining agreements.88 The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion
the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2 of the FAA in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), strongly supports this narrow
interpretation of section 1 .... [A]lthough the Supreme Court did not address the
issue of section l's scope in Gilmer, the majority's decision suggests that the Court
would be inclined to accept the narrow interpretation we adopt.
See George Nicolau, Gilmer, It's Ramifications and Implicationsfor Employees, Employers
and Practitioners,1 U. PA. LAB. & Em'. LJ. 1 (1998).
According to the majority opinion, Gilmer had signed a securities registration application which was not a contract of employment. Therefore, we do not know with
any certainty whether managerial and non-represented employees who sign or are
otherwise bound by employment agreements are required to arbitrate their statutory claims under the FAA. The Court, as it said, has left that "scope of exclusion"
question "for another day." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
25 (1991). That day will arrive, and when it does it is altogether likely that the
Court will select the narrow interpretation adopted by the overloaded courts below.
As Professor Matthew Fimkin of the University of Illinois has convincingly demonstrated, both before and after Pryner,those courts are wrong in that they have completely misread the FAA's legislative history. See Matthew W. Fmkin, "Workers'
Contracts" Under the United States ArbitrationAct: An Essay in HistoricalClarification, 17 BERKELEY J. E?". & LAB. L. 282 (1996); Employment Contracts Under

the FAA - Reconsidered, 48 LAB. L.J. 329, 333 (1997). Nevertheless, our highest
court, driven by policy considerations, will most probably agree with them.
Id.
85. See generally Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995).
86. See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1953), which was followed by most circuits. See, e.g., Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 597-99; Miller
Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984);
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v.
DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
87. See, e.g., Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450
(3d Cir. 1953), which was followed by most circuits; See also Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 597-99;
Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir.
1984); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972);
Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
88. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Realty Advisory Bd., 107 F.3d 979, 982 (2d Cir, 1997).
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9 The Ninth Circuit9" and the Eleventh Circuit 9 ' have
in Pryner."
not decided whether collective bargaining agreements are subject to

the FAA.
The Sixth Circuit still finds that collective bargaining agreements
are outside the scope of the FAA,92 as does the Fifth Circuit.93 The
Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its earlier decision in Tenney, 94 in
which it held that "the FAA's exemption of coverage ... is limited

to those employment contracts in the transportation industries and
does not affect collective bargaining agreements in other areas." 95
The Fourth Circuit, in Austin, noted that "in this circuit, the FAA is

not applicable96 to labor disputes arising from collective bargaining
agreements.

Clearly, the Court has appellate jurisdiction under § 16(a)(2) of the Act. Section 2
of the Act makes all contracts entailing transactions in commerce subject to the Act.
Although § 1 of the Act excludes coverage for 'contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of employees engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce,' that exclusion is not applicable in this case because, in our Circuit,
section l's exclusion is limited to workers involved in the transportation industries.
It.; see, e.g., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Cartage Co., 84 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 276 (1996); Erving, 468 F.2d
at 1069. "Since collective bargaining agreements are contracts entailing transactions in commerce, the bargaining agreement in the instant case falls within the purview of the Act.. .
Maryland Cas. Co., 107 F.3d at 982.
89. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 356-58 (7th Cir. 1997).
90. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the FAA's application to employment contracts is unresolved, but the court will
not reach issue because it is not raised below).
91. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997).
92. A district court may issue a stay upon a finding that a plaintiff was not "in default"
in seeking to compel arbitration if the case arises under the Federal Arbitration Act, but the
FAA does not apply to labor contracts. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d
305, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1991); Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404 (6th
Cir. 1988).
93. See Rojas v. TK Comm., Inc., 87 F3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[N]umerous other
courts have addressed this very issue, the majority of which have determined that the
exclusionary language present in § 1 is to be narrowly construed.")
94. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 226-27 (3d Cir. 1997).
95. Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782,791 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Tenney,
207 F.2d at 453); see Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd,
972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 995
(3d Cir. 1997) (finding it had jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award, the court still noted,
"[i]n this case the parties undertook arbitration pursuant to their collective bargaining
agreement, and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1995) is not binding.").
96. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996).
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This issue requires clarification. The Supreme Court pointedly
decided Gilmer under the FAA,97 while finding Alexander to be
controlling in cases involving labor disputes. 98 If the Fourth Circuit
does not apply the FAA to labor disputes, but other circuits do,
there will be disagreement about whether so-called "voluntary"
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims under collective bargaining
agreements may be enforced under the FAA.
Can Mandatory ArbitrationProvisions in Collective Bargaining
Agreements be Voluntary?
A disturbing assumption made by the Third, Fourth and Sixth
Circuits is that mandatory arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements are voluntary agreements made by individual
employees. 99 Because of this assumption, courts have enforced
arbitration of individual statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements. 100 Yet, how can an agreement made between the
union and the employer be an agreement made voluntarily by the
individual bargaining unit member?
The Fourth Circuit, in Austin, decided that it need not be concerned about the possible tension between collective representation
and statutory rights because Austin was "party to a voluntary agreement" and had explicitly agreed to the arbitration of her statutory
complaint. 101 Therefore, it found that the case, like Gilmer,
involves the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims.' 0 2 The court did not recognize that, although the
agreement may have been voluntary on the part of the union, Austin was not a party to it.' °3 Nevertheless, the court found that it
must enforce arbitration of Austin's statutory claims because "[t]o
decide otherwise, we would have to hold that Gilmer has no effect
at all and that Alexander is still the law that statutory claims cannot
be the subject of required arbitration. We do not think that Congress intended to return to the old law."'0 4
97. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
98. See id
99. See Martin v. Dana, 1997 WL 313054, at *9 (3d Cir. June 12,1997); Austin, 78 F.3d at
879; Wedding v. University of Toledo, 89 F.3d 316, 319 (6th Cir. 1996).
100. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-81.
101. See id. at 885.
102. See id. at 880-82.
103. See id at 887.
104. Id. at 882.
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Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court made a distinction
between voluntary agreements to arbitrate made by individuals and
mandatory arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers. The law in Alexander is not
that "statutory claims cannot be the subject of required arbitration," but that unions may not prospectively waive the rights of
individual members to a judicial forum for those rights. 105 The law
in Gilmer is that voluntary agreements to arbitrate statutory claims
are enforceable when they are made by individuals who knowingly
and voluntarily waive their rights to a judicial forum. 0 6 In fact, the
Fourth Circuit disregards the Supreme Court's own holding that the
Gilmer decision was not intended to overrule Alexander.10 7 The
Supreme Court has never repudiated its holding in Alexander;
instead, it recently reaffirmed Alexander, and distinguished it from
Gilmer, in Livadas v. Bradshaw.'0
The Third Circuit, in Martin, cited Austin for the proposition that
[w]hether the dispute arises under a contract of employment
growing out of [a] securities registration application, a simple
employment contract, or a collective bargaining agreement, an
agreement has yet been made to arbitrate the dispute. So long as
the agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and we are of opinion it
should be enforced. 10 9
The Third Circuit recognized that neither the statutory language
nor the Gilmer decision specifically addressed the situation found in
Martin's case, in which both the individual and the union can com105. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
106. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
107. See id.
108. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
In holding that an agreement to arbitrate an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act claim is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, Gilmer emphasized its

basic consistency with our unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
permitting a discharged employee to bring a Title VII claim, notwithstanding his

having already grieved the dismissal under a collective-bargaining agreement.
Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver as relying, inter alia, on: the 'distinctly
separate nature of ... contractual and statutory rights' (even when both were
'violated as a result of the same factual occurrence'); the fact that a labor 'arbitrator

has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights;' and the concern that in
collective-bargaining arbitration, "the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit."

Id at 127 n.21 (citations omitted).
109. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996).
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pel arbitration. 110 It decided, however, that because Martin did not
have to persuade the union to prosecute his grievance, the case
lacked the same "tension between individual and group interests"
and the "potential disparity in interests between a union and an
employee" was no longer a matter of concern.'11 Where the individual employee can compel arbitration, it concluded, "Gilmer, not
Alexander, should control."' 12 What the court failed to consider is
that, in order for Gilmer to control, the agreement must have been
made knowingly and voluntarily. Like Austin, Martin did not negotiate the waiver of his right to a judicial forum; therefore, it is Alexander which must apply." 3
The Sixth Circuit's case, Wedding, illustrates, in a different context, a similar assumption about the voluntary nature of an agreement to arbitrate. 1 4 There, the court reasoned that "when an
employer and its employees agree to a [collective bargaining agreement] providing for arbitration of grievances arising under that
CBA, they have bargained for the decision of an arbitrator, not of a
court.""' 5 This is good law when grievances are based on disputes
about collective rights granted to the bargaining representative on
behalf of its members, but not so in cases involving the statutory
rights of individuals." 6 The erroneous underpinning of this decision is the court's assumption that the parties to this collective bargaining agreement are the employer and its employees, not the
employer and the employees' bargaining representative. 1 7 There
was, in fact, an agreement to arbitrate, but it was made by the
110. See Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421, 425 (3d Cir. 1997).

111. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 35.
112. Martin v. Dana, 1997 WL 313054, at *8 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997).

113. See id. at *5. In fact, Martin's attorney commented, in a conversation with the
author, that Martin was a member of a racial minority in his union and that the union
leadership was not disposed to bring his Title VII claims to arbitration through the grievance
procedure. Although, under the terms of the contract, Martin could bring his grievance to
arbitration himself, he would not be represented by the union or its counsel. Id.
114. See Wedding v. University of Toledo, 89 F.3d 316, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1996).
115. Il at 319 (citing Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. International Union, United
Automotive, 981 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1992); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568
(1960)).
116. See Wedding, 89 F.3d at 317; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (discussing "the
differences between contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agreement and
individual statutory rights .... ").
117. See Wedding, 89 F.3d at 319.
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union, not the plaintiff."1 Here, again, the plaintiff's right to a judicial forum was prospectively waived by the collective bargaining
agreement and that waiver was enforced by the court.
An unvoiced assumption in these decisions may be that a collective bargaining agreement is voluntary on the part of individual
union members because the membership has ratified it. If so, it
presumes that all members of the bargaining unit have voted to ratify the contract, which is usually not the case. If not all members
have voted to ratify an agreement to take statutory disputes to arbitration, then Martin, or Austin, or any other union member with a
statutory claim, may not have made a voluntary agreement con-

cerning mandatory arbitration. 19 Therefore, it can never be
assumed that any individual union member has made the kind of
voluntary agreement which these courts find necessary to uphold
mandatory arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
Mistaking Collectively BargainedAgreements for Individual
Agreements to Arbitrate
Some courts have compelled statutory arbitration under collective bargaining agreements because they mistook them for individual, voluntary agreements that may be enforced under the FAA. It
is difficult to understand the genesis of this misconception, since the
"Gilmer" cases are easily distinguishable from those that involve
collective bargaining agreements. In the former, there is no union
and no collective bargaining agreement, just an individual who
makes an agreement with an employer.' 20
118. See id. at 317-18.
119. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997).
An agreement negotiated by the union elected by a majority of the workers in the
bargaining unit binds all the members of the unit, whether they are part of the
majority or for that matter even members of the union entitled to vote for union
leaders - they need not be.
Id. See also LaChance v. Northeast Publ'g Corp., 965 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D. Mass. 1997)
[raising] some of the issues litigated in Gilmer, but in an entirely different setting not an arbitration clause in an individual employment agreement, in which there is
at least the fiction of individual bargaining, but in the context of an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement, negotiated by a union representative, to
which [the plaintiff] was bound solely by dint of membership in the union.
.
Id.
120. See Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Not surprisingly, because traditional labor arbitration is so celebrated in the United
States, it is easy for the uninitiated to fall prey to the suggestion that the legal
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The error began in Austin. Each time that the Fourth Circuit
cited precedential cases in its argument to compel arbitration, the
cases it cited involved individuals who were not union members. 21
Without distinguishing between individual agreements to arbitrate
and agreements made by collective bargaining representatives, the
Fourth Circuit assumed that Austin's arbitration must be
mandatory because she had not shown that Congress intended
otherwise. 2 2 This is a requirement for the enforcement of individual, voluntary arbitration agreements, but not for collectively bargained ones. Furthermore, in its argument concerning anticipatory
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, the court cited three securities industry cases in which a party sought to compel arbitration
under an individual employment contract.'23 In not one of these
cases was the plaintiff compelled to arbitrate under a collective bargaining agreement. 24
By missing this first, most elementary distinction, the circuit court
set down a path from which, logically, it can now compel arbitration
in all cases. If a provision in an agreement bargained for by a union
representative is indeed a voluntary agreement made by the plaintiff herself, and if this "voluntary" agreement thus becomes subject
to the law as expressed in Gilmer and its progeny, then certainly
there is no need to follow Alexander any longer and all statutory
employment cases now in the circuit's .courts may be sent to
arbitration.
A similar mistake was made in Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., z where the district court based its decision to compel arbitration on the erroneous statement that, in Gilmer, "a CBA arbitration
precepts governing the enforcement and review of arbitration emanating from
collective bargaining should be equally applicable to arbitration of all employment

disputes. This is a mischievous idea, one that we categorically reject.
Id.
121. For example, in discussing the Supreme Court's support of arbitration as a forum,
the Fourth Circuit quotes the passages in Gilmer in which the Court discussed arbitration of
the commercial, statutory cases that arose under the FAA. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway

Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996).
122. See id.
123. See id at 882-83 (citing Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th
Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Vitter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991)); Willis v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
124. See idat 883-84 (citing Bender, 971 F.2d at 701; Alford, 939 F.2d at 229; Willis, 948
F.2d at 312).
125. 959 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1997).
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clause was held to preclude the employee from bringing" his statutory claim, although Gilmer was not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 26 The court then noted that in Almonte, "[like
Gilmer, the arbitration clause in [the] CBA expressly includes
claims of discrimination in violation of federal law. ' 127 In finding
arbitration mandatory, it decided to adopt a "more limited view of
the Court's holdings in [Gardner-Denverand Barrentine]. Under
this view," it held, "the exclusion of individual statutory claims from
the collective-bargaining process would take the form of a rebuttable presumption rather than an absolute requirement: that is, the
courts would assume that individual statutory claims were excluded
from grievance procedures unless the collective bargaining agreement expressly provided otherwise.'1 2 8 Following this novel theory, the court found that the plaintiff's statutory claim was
precluded by the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining
agreement because he had not shown affirmatively that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for claims under
section 1981 of the United States Code.' 29
For the proposition that "the Court must resolve any doubt in
favor of arbitration," the Eastern District of Virginia, in Bright v.
Norshipco & Norfolk Shipbuilding,3 ' cited Dean Witter Reynolds v.
Byrd,'31 a case that concerns an individual employment contract in
the securities industry, falls under the FAA and has nothing to do
with labor relations, unions or collective bargaining agreements. 32
Assiduously following Austin, the Bright court found that the plaintiff had been a voluntary party to a collective bargaining provision
126. See id.
at 573.
127. Id. at 573-74.
128. Id. at 574 (quoting Claps v. Moliterno Stone Sales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141, 147 n.6 (D.
Conn. 1993)).
129. See Almonte, 959 F. Supp. at 574. This theory seems to import the Mitsubishi
holding into a case in which there is a statutory employment claim under a collective
bargaining agreement, and then grafts it to the holding in Gilmer. As noted above, however,
neither Mitsubishi nor Gilmer were labor relations cases.
130. 951 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Va. 1997).
131. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). This case was cited by Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24, for the
proposition that the purpose of the enactment of the FAA was "to reverse the long-standing
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had
been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts." Id.
132. See Dean Witter, 470 U.S. 213. This argument may have been intended to buttress
the court's subsequent polemic concerning its desire to use arbitration to reduce the number
of cases on its calendar.
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mandating arbitration of his Title VII and ADA claims. 133
Although it is true, as the district court reminds us, that there is a
presumption of arbitrability enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy, 134 that presumption applies to arbitration of traditional, contractual labor relations grievances, with which Bright is not
concerned. 3 5

In Jessie v. CarterHealth Care Center, Inc.,' 36 the court also confuses cases of individual, voluntary agreements to arbitrate with
those concerning arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
agreements. 37 In essence, the court cites securities industry cases
involving individual contracts to arbitrate employment disputes,
then transforms those inapposite cases into the basis for compelling
arbitration of statutory rights through the grievance procedure of a
collective bargaining agreement, with not even a nod to cases that
are on point. In fact, the court disposes of Alexander in one sentence, finding only that "[i]n Gilmer the Supreme Court takes a
very different tack to preclusion significantly departing from
1' 38
Alexander.'
Similarly, the Martin court cites eight cases for the proposition,
central to the case, that, "[s]ince Gilmer, courts have repeatedly
held that Title VII claims, like ADEA claims, are subject to
mandatory arbitration.' 1 39 Of the cited cases that the court
acknowledges, only Austin "arose in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. The other cases all involved arbitration clauses
in employment contracts and securities registration applications."'14 0 Without examining whether it should distinguish between
the two kinds of cases, the court concluded that it should compel
arbitration.' 4 '
133. See Bright, 951 F. Supp. at 98-99.
134. See idat 98 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960)).
135. See id. at 98 n.1.
136. 930 F.Supp. 1174 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
137. See Jessie, 930 F. Supp. at 1176 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Wilis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1991), to
show that "it is permissible to enter into an agreement to arbitrate a claim based on a
statutory right such as Title VII").
138. Jessie, 930 F. Supp. at 1177.
139. Martin v. Dana, 1997 WL 313054, at *6 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997), vacated and reh'g
granted, 114 F.3d 428 (1997).

140. Id.
141. Id.
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What is the outcome when a court does recognize and follow the
appropriate cases? This is what happened in Harrison,Pryner,Varner, and Tran, as well as in cases in other federal courts. 142 The
Eastern District of Texas decided a case in which the union and the
employer had not agreed to arbitrate statutory claims. 43 Neverthe-

less, the employer moved to dismiss the Title VII claims on the
grounds that the issues had been raised in a prior grievance arbitration.'" Relying on Alexander, Barrentine,and McDonald, and distinguishing Gilmer, the court held that mandatory arbitration of
Title VII claims under a collective agreement is invalid. 1 45 It

reasoned,
Gardner-Denver involved an arbitration clause contained in a
collective-bargaining agreement, while Gilmer, in contrast,
involved an arbitration clause contained in an individualemployment contract between a stockbroker and his employer ....
[N]othing in Gilmer suggests that a union through a CBA can
waive an
employee's right to litigate a Title VII claim in federal
6
court.

14

The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case which
arose in the context of the Railway Labor Act, 47 as did the District
142. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor

Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209
(8th Cir. 1996); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995).
143. See Bush v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 940 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
144. See id. at 1042.
145. See id. at 1043-44.
146. Id. at 1044 (italics in original); see also Foster v. Bechtel, 1996 WL 784506 at *5
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1996) (citing Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1140, 1147,
1148 (S.D. Ind. 1996)) in which the district court came to the same conclusion on similar
facts. The court found Alexander to be controlling because
the existence of a possible remedy to the plaintiff under the collective bargaining
agreement did not foreclose his right to pursue his ADA and Title VII statutory
claims. Pryner held that neither the plaintiff's prior arbitration under his collective
bargaining agreement of the claims he brought in federal court, nor his failure to
arbitrate said claims previously had any bearing upon his right to enforce the
statutory rights he was asserting.
Foster, 1996 WL 784506 at *5.
147. See Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 60 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir.
1995) (involving an employee who filed a claim of religious discrimination, the court upheld
his right to the judicial forum, finding that "[t]here is no doubt that Title VII rights, which the
CBA never expressly references, 'exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement."'
(quoting Hawaiian Airlines Inc. v. Norris, 12 U.S. 246,260 (1994))). "Because Title VII and
the RLA, as applied to this railway agreement, each provide a mechanism for resolving a
claim of religious discrimination does not mean that the Title VII rights are 'created or
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Court of the District of Columbia when a nurse filed for both griev-

ance arbitration
and judicial resolution of her claim of dis48
crimination.

The Tension Between Majority and Minority Interests Within
the Union
Those whom the statutes are designed to protect are often minor-

ity groups within unions, and at risk of not being heard or fairly
represented by the majority. Because it is a union's job to represent the majority, 14 9 minority, unpopular or dissident union members may find their unions unwilling to attempt to vindicate their

statutory rights. 50 It is not so farfetched to imagine a union,
charged with getting the best deal it can for the majority of its members, agreeing not to take an individual's statutory claim to arbitradefined' by the CBA." Felt, 60 F.3d at 1420. Thus, whether Felt has a meritorious Title VII
claim cannot be "'conclusively resolved"' merely by consulting the CBA. Id.
The RLA does not preclude litigation of Title VII rights. Cf.Buell, 480 U.S. at 56465 (holding, in the only Supreme Court case to deal with RLA preclusion, that the
RLA did not preclude suit under FELA for workplace injury, even though injury
was caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the RLA);
Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
992 (1993) (holding that the arbitration procedures prescribed under the RLA are
not appellants' sole forums for resolution of their claims under the Federal
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794).
Id.
148. See Matuskey v. Medlantic Healthcare Group, 1997 WL 161952, at *43 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 3, 1997). "The fact that [the antidiscrimination clause] is contained in a collective
bargaining agreement rather than in an individual employment contract defeats [the
employer's] contention that plaintiff knowingly waived her statutory rights in favor of
arbitration." Id. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court held that "[o]f
necessity, the rights conferred [by Title VII] can form no part of the collective-bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII." Alexander v. Gardner-Davis, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). The Supreme Court
subsequently held that individual contracts agreeing to binding arbitration and waiving the
statutory right to bring a civil action are enforceable. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 520 U.S. 20 (1991). The D.C. Circuit has reconciled these two holdings by concluding
that "the Supreme Court now has made clear that, as a general rule, statutory claims are fully
subject to binding arbitration, at least outside of the context of collective bargaining." Cole
v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
149. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comm. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975).
150. For example, the plaintiff in Bush alleged that he had attempted to add his claims of
racial discrimination to the grievance but was stopped by the union president. See Bush v.
Carrier Air Conditioning, 940 F. Supp. 1040, 1042 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
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tion in return for the employer's promise of some benefit to the
majority.
A union has broad discretion as to whether to prosecute a
grievance.
It may take into account tactical and strategic factors such as its
limited resources and consequent need to establish priorities...
as well as its desire to maintain harmonious relations among the
workers and between them and the employer. Corresponding to
this expansive and ill-defined discretion, the scope of judicial
review of its exercise is deferential. The result is that a worker
who asks the union to grieve a statutory violation cannot have
great confidence either that it will do so or that if it does not the
courts will intervene and force it to do so. While the grievance
machinery could in principle offer the worker a cheaper alternative to suing, it seems unlikely that the union would be any more
willing to prosecute a marginal case than a lawyer asked to handle it on a contingent-fee basis. Indeed, the union might for strategic reasons decline to prosecute a claim that would have
continenough merit to enable the worker to retain a lawyer on a 51
gent-fee basis were the worker not bound to the union.'
Conflict between majority and minority interests is illustrated in
Breech v. Alabama Power.52 The plaintiff was a member of a religious group that will not work on Saturday. 53 The company and
the union met with him many times to try to resolve the conflict
between his religious beliefs and the work schedules bargained for
by the company and the union.' 54 Although the union brought
Breech's grievance to arbitration, it "never agreed to waive or modify any provision of the CBA with regard to the scheduling of
employees or any other provision of the CBA as it related to
151. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted);
see, e.g., Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 525 (11th Cir. 1997). In
Brisentine, the Eleventh Circuit observed that
the IBEW advised Brisentine to file a complaint with the EEOC rather than file a
grievance. That advice is some indication that the union was at least unenthusiastic,
and perhaps unwilling, to pursue Brisentine's claim to arbitration ....Moreover,

the union, not Brisentine, would be obligated to bear half the cost of arbitration,
which gave it an incentive against... tak[ing] a claim to arbitration. That same
conflict of interest existed in Alexander but was absent in Gilmer.
Id.
152. 962 F. Supp. 1447 (S.D. Ala. 1997).
153. See id. at 1450.
154. See id. at 1452.
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Breech and other employees ..... 1 It could not do so without
putting other members of the bargaining unit at a disadvantage.' 56
Furthermore, a union and its membership may themselves be the
targets of a Title VII action.' 5 7 Consider the case in which a female
employee alleged a variety of egregious discriminatory practices
based on gender. 158 Most of the offensive conduct allegedly was
perpetrated by employees who were members and officers of the
union, including its President and Vice-President, and the local and
international unions were named as defendants in the statutory
suit. 15 9 When the employer and the unions moved to compel arbi-

tration of the claim, the court found that they had "contracted
amongst themselves to waive [the] plaintiff['s] rights and to submit... [her] claims against them to binding arbitration" and were
essentially seeking to enforce their own agreement against the
plaintiff. 6 ° In such cases, the union cannot act without at least the
appearance of bias, and it is questionable whether it can vigorously
prosecute the plaintiff's grievance.' 6 ' Yet proponents of mandatory
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements would have
unions as the sole proprietors of the statutory rights of their members, even in cases in which the unions themselves may be
defendants. 62
155. See id. at 1454.
156. See id.at 1451-52.
157. See Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1200-03 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the union may be liable under Title VII for refusing to process grievances of
African American members alleging racial discrimination, and acquiescing in a racially
discriminatory work environment); Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1966) (involving a union that refused to process grievances by

African American members concerning segregated plant facilities).
158. See Krahel v. Owens-Brockway, 971 F. Supp. 440 (D. Or. 1997).
159. See id. at 442-44.
160. See id. at 450.
161. See id. at 450.
If the threat of legal action was looming on the horizon, the Union and Owens
might still have a powerful incentive to resolve the problem in order to preclude a
lawsuit. Once that threat is eliminated, the situation is reversed. The Union and
Owens would both have incentive to let the claims quietly die.

Id. at 450-51.
162. The employer in Krahel argued that the plaintiff could bring a charge of breach of

the duty of fair representation against the union-defendant if she was dissatisfied with its
representation. See Krahel, 971 F. Supp. at 451. The court noted that the Supreme Court

had found that argument unpersuasive. See id. (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19).
"[H]ere the plaintiff is given no option: she must accept the Union as her representative
without regard to any conflict of interest." Krahel 971 F. Supp. at 451.
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The unions' duty of fair representation first arose because of an
historical lack of adequate representation of minorities within the
labor movement. 1 63 It cannot be assumed that unions will be sensitive to the interests of minorities, "which are the interests protected
by Title VII and the other discrimination statutes, and will seek to
vindicate those interests with maximum vigor."'"
Giving the
power to enforce minority rights to the majority is not "consistent
with the policy of these statutes or justified by the abstract desira165
bility of allowing unions and employers to cut their own deals."'
There is, of course, precedent for such dual claims in "hybrid § 301" actions where
the employee brings an action against the employer for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement along with an action against the union for breach of its duty
of fair representation. See, e.g.,Clayton v. International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace& Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 451 U.S. 679, 101 S.Ct.
2088, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186, 87 S.Ct. at 914-15; Dushaw, 66
F.3d 129. In such cases, however, the rights in question arise under the collective
bargaining agreement, which also establishes the exclusive remedy for violations of
that agreement. Ordinarily there would be no recourse to the courts.
Consequently, it is incumbent upon the employee to establish the existence of
extraordinary circumstances that justify invocation of a judicial remedy.
Krahel, 971 F. Supp. at 452. Defendants in these cases may also claim that § 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), allows a plaintiff to pursue a grievance
independently of the Union. "While § 159(a) gives plaintiff a right to 'present' her grievances to her employer, it apparently does not compel Owens to meet with plaintiff, let alone
to take any action on her grievances." Krahel, 971 F. Supp. at 451. The Seventh Circuit also
rejected that argument by an employer. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362
(7th Cir. 1997).
This raises the spectre of three suits to enforce a statutory right - the suit against
the union to force it to grieve and if necessary arbitrate the grievance, the arbitration proceeding, and the resumed district court proceeding if the workers' rights
under the collective bargaining agreement are more limited than their statutory
rights.
Id.
163. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952).
164. Pryner,109 F.3d at 362-63. See also LaChance v. Northeast Publ'g, Inc., 965 F. Supp.
177, 184 (D. Mass. 1997). ("[W]here the arbitration agreement only agrees to arbitrate
claims arising from rights provided in the CBA, an employee cannot be precluded from
bringing separate statutory claims, even when two claims arise out of the same factual
scenario."). The court notes that Congress extended the Americans with Disabilities Act to
protect employees against unions as well as employers. Id. "This provision no doubt reflects
the labor movement's 'long history' of mistreatment of minority workers." Id. at 188 n.21.
165. Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363. An example of the possible conflict of interest created by
such mandatory arbitration provisions is the following clause contained in the collective
bargaining agreement in Bynes v. Ahrenkiel Ship Management Inc., 944 F. Supp. 485 (W.D.
La. 1996). In a contract containing an antidiscrimination clause, Article II § 4(m) of the
grievance and arbitration procedure provides:
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May Unions Bargain with Individuals' Rights?
The Austin court thinks so. It found that "a union has the right
and duty to bargain for the terms and conditions of employment,"
and "[t]here is no reason to distinguish between a union bargaining
away the right to strike and a union bargaining for the right to arbitrate."' 66 Does a union own its members' statutory rights, and can
it use those rights as a bargaining chip?
In Jessie v. CarterHealth Care Center,Inc. for example, the court
finds that a union is under a statutory duty to bargain on behalf of
its employees and, in so doing, may waive certain rights. 167 The
difference between arbitrating a statutory claim and taking it to
court, the Jessie court says, is merely a matter of a choice of forum
and choice of forum is a right like any other, one which can be
made part of the bargain by the union and, thus, waivable. 68
Therefore, Jessie must take her statutory discrimination claim
through the grievance and arbitration procedure provided in the
collective bargaining agreement. 69 This holding by a district court
is in striking contrast to the Supreme Court's holding in Alexander
that, while a union is entitled to bargain with "statutory rights
related to collective activity, such as the right to strike," it may not
do so with the "individual's right to equal employment opportunities," and that "rights conferred [on an individual by Title VII] can
form no part of the collective-bargaining process .... ")170
The findings of these courts wrongly reduce the question of
whose rights are being bargained away, settling for the simpler conclusion that the union has merely waived choice of forum. By so
No Covered Person shall have the right to demand arbitration under the provisions

hereof, such right to arbitration being limited to the Union and the Company; and
no Covered Person shall have the right to institute any action based upon this
Agreement for wrongful discharge or because of any breach of this Agreement,
such right of action being limited to the Union and the Company; and if any claim is
made at any time by any of the Covered Personnel against the Company or the

Union under the provisions of this Agreement, any agreement or adjustment made
by or between the Union and the Company with respect to such dispute shall be
final and binding upon the Covered Personnel.

Bynes, 944 F. Supp. at 486 (emphasis added). The court, following Alexander, refused to
compel arbitration of the statutory claims.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir. 1996).
See Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
See id.
See id.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
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doing, they have avoided grappling with larger issues of union
rights and duties. Where there is a collective bargaining agreement,
the "choice of forum" argument is seriously flawed. The judicial
forum, which these courts believe may be bargained away by a
union on behalf of its members, gives a plaintiff an absolute right to
pursue Title VII claims individually, without the cooperation or
permission of the union. The plaintiff's case would be decided by a
jury or a federal judge, not a panel selected exclusively by the
employer and union, one or both of whom would be defendants in a
statutory case.
Other individual rights bargained away by the union along with
the choice of forum may be the right to a longer limitation period
and certain remedies available to the plaintiff under Title VII and
other statutes. When arbitration of statutory claims is mandatory
under a collective bargaining agreement, it is the union and
employer who decide how long a plaintiff may wait to bring a
claim.17 ' Also, under Title VII, an employee may recover compensatory and punitive damages and legal fees, but an arbitrator under
has no such explicit authority to
a collective bargaining 17agreement
2
grant these recoveries.
Although the parties to a labor contract might put these rights
back into the agreement, it would be done at their pleasure and not
because the grievant had a right to them, as the grievant would
171. The statute of limitations in a Title VII action is 300 days, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
(1994), and evidence of earlier incidents may be admissible to prove a continuing violation.

See Krahel v. Owens-Brockway, 971 F. Supp. 440, 452 (D. Or. 1997) (citing Varner, 94 F.3d
1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 1996)). That is not the case with most collective bargaining agreements.
A shorter limitation period may be suitable for the types of claims that commonly arise under
a collective bargaining agreement. In statutory cases, however, it may not be a particular
isolated act that gives rise to the claim, but a pattern of conduct. See Krahel, 971 F. Supp. at
452-53.
172. A number of cases have concluded that there is no right to punitive damages. See
generally International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979) (denying
punitive damages); Association of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 976 F.2d
541, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing this policy as rationale for denying award of attorney fees to
prevailing party); Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277,
284 (3d Cir. 1962) (Biggs J., concurring) ("It is the general policy of the federal labor laws...
to supply remedies rather than punishment."); see, e.g., Moore v. Local Union 569, 989 F.2d
1534, 1542 (9th Cir. 1993); United Transp. Union, 881 F.2d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1989); 'Williams
v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 421 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1970); Atwood v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491, 498 (D. Or. 1977). But cf , Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925
F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1991) (awarding punitive damages against union for racial
discrimination against member).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

27

Hofstra
Labor
and&Employment
Journal, Vol. 15,[Vol.
Iss. 15:137
1 [1997], Art. 5
Hofstra
Labor
Employment Law
Law Journal

under a statute. 173 Therefore, contractual rights and remedies can
never be substantially equivalent to those available to the plaintiff
in the judicial forum. Indeed, it is questionable whether the plaintiff could "effectively vindicate" those rights in a process in which
all rights are controlled by the union and the employer.

74

Unions stand in place of their members only in certain circumstances, those in which an individual's right is extinguished and
transferred to the union so that it may represent the collective
interests of its members in matters concerning labor relations. 175
This principle is at the heart of the decision in Alexander.176 Rights
derived by individuals from employment statutes are not the kind
of rights that reside in a union; therefore, a union cannot bargain
or in any other way negotiate with them.'7 7
173. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1498, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(discussing that whereas the. National Labor Relations Act created waivable group and
individual rights, "Title VII established nonwaivable individual rights, redressable in federal
court ....
") (Edwards, C.J., concurring). "[T]he Supreme Court has flatly rejected
arguments suggesting that statutory rights may be waived by an agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1502.
174. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 28 (1991).
175. Under the National Labor Relations Act, Congress empowered unions to bargain
exclusively for all employees in a particular bargaining unit. See International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers. v. Foust, 442 U.S. 49 (1979); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944). The effect of this authorization was that it "subordinated individual interests to the
interests of the unit as a whole." Foust,442 U.S. at 46 (1979); see, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 182 (1967).
176. See also Krahel, 971 F. Supp. at 452
[T]he [statutory] rights at issue here were not created by the collective bargaining
agreement, but by Congress. They do not arise from the contract. There was no
consideration for the employer's promise to follow the civil rights laws, for that duty
already existed. These rights are not subject to negotiation ... [n]or is a union
authorized to compromise an employee's civil rights for the good of the bargaining
unit as a whole.
Id.
177. The National Labor Relations Act, authorizing unions to represent employees in the
creation and administration of collective bargaining agreements with employers, together
with the correlative duty of fair representation, however, is limited to the collective
bargaining process. See Foust,442 U.S. at 46; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182; Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953); Steele, 323
U.S. at 204; Freeman v. Local Union No. 135 Chauffeurs, 746 F.2d 1316,1321 (7th Cir. 1984)
("If... a particular form of redress is not relegated to the exclusive domain of the union, an
individual employee is free to seek that avenue."); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 657-58 (1965). "[W]aivers of statutory rights in collective bargaining agreements are not
in the same class as individual, knowing contractual waivers. [E]ven if [the grievance and
arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement]were interpreted as an attempt to
waive the plaintiff's statutory rights, it would be ineffective," because these rights do not
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Are Statutory Employment Claims Really Labor Disputes?
In deciding Austin, the Fourth Circuit starts with and relies on
"the well-recognized federal labor law favoring arbitration of labor
disputes"'178 to compel arbitration of statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements. Is a statutory employment claim a
labor dispute? Both Alexander and Gilmer clearly say it is not. If it
is not, then the reasoning behind Austin and those cases decided in
its image is faulty from inception.
If a dispute arises from the collective bargaining agreement and
also concerns a collective right held by the union on behalf of its
members, then the grievance can be considered a labor dispute. If
the source of the claim to be arbitrated is a statute which the
employer and the union are bound by law to obey, and the right in
question is held by the individual and is not related to collective
interests, the complaint can be considered an employment dispute.
Remembering the history of arbitration of statutory and industrial disputes helps to put the difference between labor and employment disputes into focus. Arbitration of commercial, not statutory,
claims was first proposed by Congress in 1925.179 Arbitration of
contractual labor grievances was endorsed by the Supreme Court,
beginning in 1957.180 Neither the FAA, nor enforcement of grievance arbitration under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, contemplated the arbitration of statutory claims.' 8 ' In 1974, the Alexander
decision reminded unions and employers that individual employees
had statutory rights to judicial forums that could not be subsumed
by a collective bargaining agreement. 82 In the 1980's, the Supreme
reside in the union. Matuskey v. Medlantic Healthcare Group, 1997 WL 161952, at *3 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 3, 1997).
178. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996).
179. See Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 833 (1925), codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1-307 (1994).
180. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
181. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims arising under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims under civil
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and section 10(b) of
the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims
under the Sherman Antitrust Act). Only in the 1980s did the Court create this presumption,
i.e., that Congress did not intend to prohibit arbitration of statutory claims unless the statute
specifically prohibited it.
182. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
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Court began to accept arbitration of statutory claims in a commer-

cial setting. 183 In 1991, the Court in Gilmer enforced agreements to
arbitrate contained in individual employment contracts, as long as
the waiver of the judicial forum was knowing and voluntary and
14
arbitration did not undermine the intent of the relevant statute. 8
Then, in 1994, the Court reminded us that it had distinguished Gilmer from Alexander.'85 Throughout, the Supreme Court has been
careful to distinguish among arbitration of labor disputes, commercial disputes, statutory claims and employment claims under individual contracts and collective bargaining agreements. 86
18 7
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not make such a distinction.
It simply assumed that Austin's employment claim was a labor dispute and, as such, subject to arbitration under the contract. 188 Since
Austin's claim was not a labor dispute, but an employment claim as
clearly distinguished by the Supreme Court,18 9 the cases cited by
the Fourth Circuit concerning federal policy favoring arbitration do
not apply and its fundamental assumption about the arbitrability of
the claim has no legal precedent.
The Fourth Circuit also raised a related issue, finding that Austin
was bound to arbitrate her Title VII and ADA claims because "the
collective bargaining agreement specifically lists gender and disability discrimination as claims that are subject to arbitration.' 190
Importing "non-discrimination" language into a collective bargaining agreement does not automatically convert the agreement into a
statute from which separate, individual rights may be derived. That
183. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483 (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate
claims arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2));
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242 (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims under civil
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and section 10(b) of
the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 473 U.S. at 629
(enforcing agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act).
184. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
185. See Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 127 (1994).
186. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50. See also Lividas, 512
U.S. 107 (1994) (holding that California law was inconsistent with federal law when
arbitration agreements precluded claims pursuant to statutory law).
187. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
188. See id. at 879 (interpreting arbitration agreements of labor disputes without first
analyzing and determining whether the claim was a labor dispute).
189. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 ("[Courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in
enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution
of discriminatory employment claims."). Austin's claim was for discrimination. See id. at 42.
190. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86.
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would be analogous to including criminal statutes in a contract and
allowing an arbitrator to impose a sentence, depriving an employee
of liberty or property. The court upholds what it sees as arbitration
of a labor relations grievance, thus finding that the authority to
arbitrate derives from the contract. 191 However, Austin's rights
were independent of the contract and derived from the statutes
passed by Congress.' 92
The Argument About CongressionalIntent
In Alexander, the Supreme Court expressed a concern that
"waiver of these [statutory employment] rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VIL"' 9 The Fourth
Circuit paid attention to this concern, finding that it had been obviated by Gilmer and the language of the statutes itself.194 In that
court's view, Gilmer laid to rest, forever and with regard to all statutes, the argument that arbitration is inconsistent with Congress's
purpose in enacting such statutory rights. Therefore, it finds,
the burden is on [the plaintiff] to show that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims. If such
an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the
ADEA, its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict'
between
195
arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes.
To support its argument, the court cited language added to Title
VII, the ADEA and the ADA in 1991 that stated that "where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution ... is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of federal law amended
by this title."' 96 The Fourth Circuit's lead was followed enthusiastically by the Third Circuit, in Martin v. Dana Corp.,197 and several
lower courts.'98 The new language in the statutes encouraged the
191. See id.
192. See idL
at 881.
193. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
194. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-81.
195. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citation omitted);
Austin, 78 F.3d at 881.
196. Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 118 and 188, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
197. 1997 WL 313054 (3rd Cir. June 12, 1997).
198. See, e.g., Bright v. Norshipco & Norfolk Shipbuilding, 951 F. Supp. 95, 96-98 (E.D.
Va. 1997); Francini v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 937 P.2d 1382, 1389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
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Third Circuit to find that the amendment "certainly undermines
the portion of the Supreme Court's Alexander opinion expressing a
mistrust of the arbitral process."' 199

However, other courts have found differently. In two similar
cases, the courts expressly rejected the contention that this language abrogates the holding in Alexander. °0 The Seventh Circuit
also found this argument to be inconsistent with the legislative history of the amendments.2"' "It would be at least a mild paradox," it
said, "for Congress, having in another amendment that it made to
Title VII in 1991 conferred a right to trial by jury for the first
time,202 to have empowered unions, in those same amendments,
to
2' 0 3
prevent workers from obtaining jury trials in these cases.
The Jessie court relied on the Austin version of the ADA's legislative history to compel arbitration of a claim under that statute.20 4
Closer scrutiny of that legislative history might have yielded a different result. Harvey S. Mars, writes, for example:
Even though the ADA's legislative history indicates that arbitration is considered the preferable method of dispute resolution,
see 136 Cong. Rec. H4582, H4606 (daily ed. July 12, 1990), it was
not meant to supplant federal rights created under the statute. As
was noted in the Judiciary Committee Report on the ADA, arbitration of an ADA claim was not meant to waive an individual's
entitlement to sue under the Act. The Judiciary Committee
pointed out that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
199. Martin v. Dana, 1997 WL 313054, at *6 (3d Cir. June 12, 1997). The court was
paraphrasing Gilmer, where the Supreme Court stated that its historical mistrust of
arbitration as a forum had been "undermined" by its subsequent decisions. The circuit court,
however, failed to take into account the fact that the Gilmer Court's treatment of arbitration
of individual, voluntary agreements was based on different principles than the Alexander
Court's concern about agreements to arbitrate found in collective bargaining agreements.
200. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1997); Krahel v.
Owens-Brockway, 971 F. Supp. 440, 446 (D. Or. 1997).
201. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363.
202. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, § 1977 A(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991).
203. Pryner,109 F.3d at 363. In addition, the legal responsibilities imposed on employers
under the ADA often directly conflict with the interests of the union. See Harvey S. Mars,
Collective BargainingUnder the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, Title 1, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36,
37 (1994); Rose Daly-Rooney, Note, Reconciling Conflicts Between the ADA and the NLRA
to Accommodate People with Disabilities,6 DEPAuL. Bus. L.J. 387, 392-393 (1993). For
example, an accommodation may involve transferring a disabled employee to a light work
duty position, which may violate seniority rights collectively established by the union.
204. See Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
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agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provi-

sions of this Act." House CoMM.

ON JuDIcIARY,

Americans

With Disabilities Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 596, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598.205
Congress has shown no intention of endorsing arbitration of statutory employment claims as an exclusive forum, nor has it
addressed the concern raised in Alexander about waiver of statutory rights. The "Congressional intent" arguments of those courts
that compel such arbitration under collective bargaining contracts
are, therefore, unpersuasive.
IV.

A

SIMPLER SOLUTION ....

There has been much ado about Alexander and Gilmer in the
context of compelling arbitration of statutory employment claims
under collective bargaining agreements. 20 6 The courts have
examined, or ignored, the issues of jurisdiction under the FAA, the
voluntary nature of the agreement, individual versus collective
rights, Congressional and judicial intent, and the history of arbitration as a forum. 7 The multiplicity of issues and criteria for decision-making has produced a profusion and confusion of differing
holdings and pronouncements. 20 8
There is a simpler way to decide when, and whether, to enforce
an arbitration agreement. Only one question need be asked, and
that is: "who made the bargain?" Answering that question at the
outset determines whether the agreement should be enforced. If an
individual who is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement
signs an agreement to arbitrate, then, according to Gilmer and its
progeny, it is an agreement made knowingly and voluntarily and is
enforceable by the Federal Arbitration Act.20 9 If, on the other
205. Harvey S.Mars, An Overview of Title I of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct and its
Impact Upon FederalLabor Law, 12 Hosris
LAB.L.J. 251, 306 n.337 (1995).
206. See Jessie, 930 F. Supp. at 1176-77.
207. See id.

208. See Krahel v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 440,444 (D. Or.
1997) (stating, "[w]hether an employer and labor union may agree between themselves to

arbitrate or otherwise limit an employee's civil rights claims has long been the subject of
controversy."); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1997).
209.
Admittedly, there is some incongruity between the holdings in Alexander and

Gilmer. As a practical matter, an arbitration clause inserted in a personal
employment contract may be no more 'voluntary' than one inserted in a collective
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hand, a union and an employer make a bargain for mandatory arbitration of statutory claims that automatically waives the statutory
rights of individual unit members, then Alexander controls and the
agreement may not be enforced.
V.

. .

AND LOOKING BEYOND ENFORCEMENT

Asking the right question is the simple solution to the problem of
distinguishing between Gilmer and Alexander and, thereby, deciding whether to enforce an arbitration agreement. Union members
cannot be compelled to waive, involuntarily or without knowledge,
statutory rights to judicial forums, nor may a union prospectively
waive or bargain with these rights on behalf of its members.210
However, unions and employers would like to use arbitration to
resolve what we might characterize as "statutory grievances."
There are many ways to approach the challenge of finding the fairest way to proceed when a bargaining unit member asserts a statutory claim under a collective bargaining agreement. What follows is
a discussion of possibilities and consequences. How have unions
become involved in statutory disputes between employers and
employees? The common thread that runs through all of the cases
considered here is a contract provision that bars discriminatory conduct on the part of the employer. It is this contractual language
that has caused the confusion; having agreed to the contract provision, the parties are bound to arbitrate the statutory grievances arising from it, but cannot, because such an agreement is
unenforceable. This puts the union in an untenable position, at risk
of a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation and yet
unable, because of the concerns expressed in Alexander and its
progeny, to agree to a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration scheme on
behalf of its members.
One way around this problem, is simply to remove nondiscrimination clauses from collective bargaining agreements. Individuals
would bring statutory claims without the assistance of the union,
bargaining agreement. Arbitration clauses such as the one in Gilmer are, for the
average employee, not the product of bargaining but a non-negotiable adhesion
contract. Consent to the arbitration clause is the price for obtaining or retaining
employment. Nonetheless, the Gilmer Court elected to distinguish Alexander

rather than overrule it, and Congress left that holding intact.
Krahel, 971 F. Supp. at 448.
210. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
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most likely in judicial forums. Unions would avoid potential conflicts of interest and suits for breaches of the duty of fair representation; in fact, unions would need only point the way to the nearest
EEOC office. Individuals and employers would spend more money
and time in litigation and the courts' calendars would be unmanageable. Or, employers might require unionized employees to sign
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements as individuals which
would be enforceable, according to Gilmer, under the FAA.2 1 '
On the other hand, if unions and employers wish to continue to
include nondiscrimination language in their contracts, is it possible
to create a system in which the union can take such a statutory
grievance to arbitration on behalf of a member without running
afoul of Alexander? It would require a plan by which statutory
rights are preserved, the needs of all parties are considered, and the
individual employee does not contend alone and unarmed with the
mightier employer and union.
In a paper presented at the 1996 New York University Conference on Labor and Employment, Max Zimny, General Counsel of
U.N.I.T.E., proposed such an arbitration system.2 12 It contains suggestions for discovery, selection and training of arbitrators, and the
form of the eventual award, and includes a number of safeguards
for arbitration of statutory employment claims made by bargaining
unit members. 213 Zinmy suggests:
The complaining employee should have the right to make a
voluntary, post-dispute decision to submit a statutory discrimination claim either to binding arbitration or to the courts. The
employee should be specifically advised to contact either union
counsel or other counsel of choice and be permitted a reasonable
period of time to do so before electing the forum for determination of the claim. The election should be offered by the employer
after the union has investigated the grievance and decided to pursue it to arbitration.
The election document should explain the legal fights of the
employee in clear, understandable language. The document
should also advise the employee to file a timely charge with the
211. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
212. See Max Zimny, Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes Under Collective
BargainingAgreements, in PROCEEDINGS OF NYU ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 175,
178 (Samuel Estreicher, ed., 1996).
213. See iL
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appropriate administrative agency even if an election is made to
arbitrate the dispute in order to preserve his or her rights in the
event the case is not settled or an award does not issue. The
election document should be signed by both the employee and
the union as well as the employer.
The election procedure should provide that the employer may
request employee election within 30 days of receipt of the
demand for arbitration. If the employer fails to serve the election document or the employee or union declines to sign it, the
employer should be precluded from raising the arbitration 14provision as defense to a court action alleging discrimination.
Although there is something for everyone not to like in this proposal, it takes into account the needs of all the parties. It also raises
new questions but, before they can be considered, it is necessary to
clarify whether we are discussing a claim arising under a statute or a
statutory grievance arising from the collective bargaining agreement. In other words, if the union takes a statutory grievance to
arbitration, what happens to the employee's other, independent
claim that arises from the statute rather than the contract? The
proposed arbitration plan speaks of one claim but, as long as there
is a nondiscrimination clause in the contract, there will always be
two.

It is possible that each claim would survive and be brought separately. This may be what Zimny is alluding to when he proposes
that "[t]he document should also advise the employee to file a
timely charge with the appropriate administrative agency even if an
election is made to arbitrate the dispute in order to preserve his or
her rights in the event the case is not settled or an award does not
'
issue."215
Alternatively, as is the case with unfair labor practices,
the claims might be maintained separately but the statutory claim
could be deferred until the statutory grievance is resolved in arbitration.216 It might also be possible to merge the claims and treat
them as one, or to eliminate one or the other altogether by a waiver
that would satisfy the Court's concerns in Alexander.21 7 If an individual were to waive the right to a judicial forum, however, there
214. Id.
215. Id.

216. This approach was rejected in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co, 415 U.S. 36, 56
(1974).
217. See id.
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would have to be a binding assurance that the union would prosecute the statutory grievance and strict sanctions would follow if it
failed to do so.
Assuming that we are only discussing the statutory grievance,
other issues arise. Who will counsel the employee when he is deciding which forum to choose? Who will pay the cost of such counsel?
Who will pay for prosecuting the claim if the employee elects to
take it to court? These questions implicate issues raised in the context of the tension between majority and minority interests within
the union. There may be instances when the interests of the majority or the officers of the union are incongruent with the interests of
the individual unit member. It may be that the individual member
is in a minority by virtue of ethnicity or gender, or is unpopular.
Perhaps the individual member is also suing the union and its
officers or is running on an insurgent slate. It may be a sensitive
issue or bad timing. Because situations such as these will arise, the
union might provide independent counsel for the member who has
a statutory grievance and elects to take it to court. That counsel
could be a plaintiff's advocate who is retained by the union, or by
the union and the employer jointly, to advise the individual. In
order to avoid conflicts or the appearance of impropriety, it might
also be advisable for independent counsel to represent the union
member at arbitration.
Then there is the issue of financial responsibility for prosecuting
the claim.218 The D.C. Circuit's decision in Cole addressed this
issue in the context of an individual's statutory claim. 19 Its conclusion bears repeating here: "[b]ecause public law confers both substantive rights and a reasonable right of access to a neutral forum in
which those rights can be vindicated, we find that employees cannot
be required to pay for the services of a 'judge' in order to pursue
their statutory rights." ' That principle should also hold in cases
where the individual claimant is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. Perhaps, if our society is serious about endorsing arbitration as a cheaper, easier and faster method of dispute resolution,
we might consider funding arbitration in the same way that we now

218. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
219. See id.
220. Id.
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fund our court system. I do not advocate this solution, but offer it

as a stepping-off point for further thought and discussion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Congress and the Supreme Court have demonstrated a preference for subjecting individual statutory employment claims to arbitration if the arbitration agreements are entered into voluntarily, if
rights to a judicial forum are knowingly waived only by the individual claimant, and if the agreement does not contravene the intention of the relevant statute. 22 1 Recently, there has been confusion
amongst the circuits about whether, and under what circumstances,
22 2
to compel arbitration of statutory employment claims.

Where courts have enforced mandatory arbitration under collectively bargained agreements, they have done so by incorrectly following the holding in Gilmer, rather than Alexander. They have not
distinguished the circumstances of these cases from those in which
the arbitration agreements were contained within individual
employment contracts. They have also sidestepped the questions of
whether the agreement was made voluntarily by the claimant and
whether the union prospectively waived the statutory rights of individual members.
In considering whether to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements within collectively bargained contracts, consideration must
be given to the tensions between majority and minority interests
within a union. If a union has the sole right to bring an individual's
statutory employment claim to arbitration, that claim may be sacrificed for the interests of the majority or ignored because the individual member is part of a minority within the unit, or is unpopular
or a dissident. The claimant may even be suing the union. It is also
questionable whether a union has the right to bargain with statutory
rights that belong to individual members.
Some courts that have enforced arbitration under collective bargaining agreements have based their decisions on an assumption of
Congressional intention to waive the judicial forum that is not
221. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

222. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1997); Martin v.
Dana Corp., 1997 WL 313054 (3rd Cir. June 12, 1997), vacated and reh'g granted, 114 F.3d
421 (1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. National
Supermarkets, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995).
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backed by the legislative history of the statutes.2' They have also
cited historical precedents for presumption of arbitrability that pertain to labor disputes, but not to employment disputes.224
A simpler way to look at this issue is to ask: "who made the bargain?" The answer to that question will determine whether Gilmer
or Alexander should apply and, consequently, whether the arbitration agreement should be enforced.
Giving a unionized employee the choice of taking a claim either
to arbitration or to court is one suggestion for resolving the question of what to do about statutory employment claims in a union
setting. A procedure needs to be in place to ensure fairness for all
parties. This article presents a few proposals and questions for creating such a procedure.

223. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (1996); see
generally Gilmer,500 U.S. at 26-29 (discussing the legislative history of select statutes relative
to arbitration).
224. See Austin, 78 F.3d 875; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
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